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This paper discusses the stranded cost concept. Stranded costs have to do with the
transition from a regulated to a more competitive market. The aim of the paper is
threefold. First, the paper discusses the place of the stranded cost concept in the variety
of costs concepts encountered in the economic literature. In order to come to a proper
description of stranded costs, we first define a new concept, i.e. strandable costs. These
are the fixed or sunk costs to be paid by the incumbents that have been imposed by the
regulator. Strandable costs become stranded when they cannot be recovered through the
market after the introduction of competition. Second, we argue on the basis of a simple
graphical analysis that from the point of view of economic efficiency, there is no need to
allow for stranded cost recovery. Third, this view is illustrated with some numerical
simulations, based on the Belgian electricity sector. These simulations suggest that,
according to the assumptions and to the definition of stranded costs in our model, there
will be no stranded costs for the Belgian electricity producers. A fortiori , the conclusion is
that there is no need to allow for stranded cost recovery. However, the simulations go one
step further and assume that for one reason or another strandable cost recovery is allowed
through a tax on electricity transmission.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The stranded costs have to do with the transition from a regulated to a competitive
electricity market. In the United States this reform started a few years earlier than in
Europe, and as such the stranded costs problem has already been the subject of a
discussion between the different actors and participants in the game. This discussion
focused on several questions, such as what is the exact definition of stranded costs?
Should the industry be able to recover them? If so, who should pay for them? And how
should they be recovered? Obviously, the discussion in the European countries will
concentrate on the same kind of questions and it is the purpose of this paper to provide
the policymakers with some conceptual background. The next section presents a definition
of the stranded cost concept. The third section discusses the recovery issue from the
point of view of efficiency. Section four presents some simulation results for the Belgian
electricity sector and, finally, section five concludes.
2. A DEFINITION OF STRANDED COSTS
Electricity generating firms make different expenditures that are considered sunk or fixed.
It would be wrong to label all of them as stranded when the electricity market is opened
up, because some of those costs would also have been made in a competitive market.
However, some fixed or sunk costs are typical for a firm operating in a regulated market.
Because they were imposed by the regulator, or because the firm chose to make these
costs. Concerning the first category, the fixed or sunk costs imposed by the regulator, one
could argue that it should be allowed to the firm to recoup these costs, whatever the
market structure is. We will call them strandable costs. However, it is difficult to defend
this position for the latter category of fixed costs.
This is summarised in Table 1. Two categories of fixed or sunk costs are distinguished,
those imposed by the regulator and those resulting from decisions taken by the firm itself.
In this paper, the costs in the first category are called strandable, those in the second
category are not strandable. If stranded costs are present, then they should be in the
strandable category, the non strandable costs cannot become stranded. But not all
strandable costs are necessarily stranded, since some of these costs can be (partially)
recovered via the market. Only those strandable costs that cannot be recovered via the
market are stranded. In the table the shaded cells indicate the stranded costs. We will
further elaborate on these concepts and their interconnection in the next section.
Summarising, strandable costs are defined as those fixed and sunk costs that were
imposed by the regulator in the regulated market. Stranded costs are then defined as
strandable costs that cannot be recovered via the market if the market is opened up for
competition. Comparing this latter definition with other ones in the literature learns that it
closely resembles the one given by Baumol, Joskow and Kahn
1. However, our definition
puts more emphasis on the role of the regulator or the supervising authority. We stress
that the regulator should impose the expenditures, whereas Baumol et. al. include
expenditures approved by the regulator. Clearly, the latter is a much broader definition of
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stranded costs because it implicitly opens the door for all sunk costs made by the
regulated firm to become stranded.












part is stranded Not stranded
RECOVERABLE VIA
THE MARKET?
No recovery Stranded Not stranded
Table 1 : The definition of strandable and stranded costs.
However, for the purpose of this paper, the exact definition of the stranded cost concept
is not that important. The major purpose of the chapter is to illustrate – given the
presence of strandable costs – how one should think about the subject from an economic
efficiency point of view.
3. THE ECONOMICS OF STRANDED COSTS :A GRAPHICAL
ANALYSIS
This section takes a look at the link between strandable costs, stranded costs and other
cost concepts. Furthermore, it tackles questions such as when do stranded costs exist? If
stranded costs exist, are there economic reasons to allow for stranded cost recoupment?
Can, on a theoretical basis, anything be said about the size of the stranded costs? These
question are answered by using graphical tools and the analysis is kept as simple as
possible
2.
3.1. The regulated market
Assume that the total demand for electricity is perfectly inelastic and equals  D q . Initially,
there is only one electricity-generating firm. This firm is called the incumbent and its cost
structure is shown in Figure 1. It is assumed that the average cost of electricity generation
( ACI ) decreases for some smaller levels of output, but in the range we are considering
the average cost of electricity generation is increasing. The incumbent’s marginal cost of
electricity generation is assumed to increase linearly
3. The average variable cost is labelled
AVCI . The vertical distance between  ACI  and  AVCI  is then a measure of the average
                                           
2 More particularly, we focus on a market with one homogenous commodity. This can be electricity delivered at
a constant flow over the year with a given level of quality. Using a multiproduct approach for electricity (peak,
off peak, etc.) is more realistic but will obscure the stranded cost analysis in this section. The simulation
model presented in the next section does however consider different consumer types and also extends the
analysis in several other ways.
3 The linearity of  MCI  (and thus also  AVCI ) is assumed for the sake of simplicity. Unless it is mentioned
explicitly, this does not influence the main conclusion of the analysis.STRANDED COSTS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 3
fixed generation cost  AFCI  (not in Figure 1). The present analysis only considers the cost
of electricity generation.
We assume that it is compulsory in the regulated market to meet the market demand and
that the regulator sets the price for electricity generation such that economic profit equals
zero, i.e.  p AC q
R
I D = ( ) . The latter assumption is made for illustrative purposes, and has
no effect on the conclusions of the analysis.
3.2. The liberalised market
Now assume that the market for electricity generation is opened up for competition and
that the market demand for electricity remains equal to qD
4. Furthermore, assume that
several potential entrants are competing for a market share and that each of these
entrants has sufficient capacity to supply the market at a constant marginal cost ( MCE ).
This assumption may be a good approximation for what will happen on the Belgian
electricity market. Belgium is a small open economy, with a relatively small production
capacity compared to the available capacity in the surrounding countries.
Competition between entrants ensures that the entrant’s price equals his marginal cost.
Furthermore, we assume that if the incumbent increases his price above the entrant’s
marginal cost, then he would immediately be pushed out of the market.
In Figure 1, the market demand for electricity qD is supplied by two generation firms, the
incumbent (I) and the entrant (E). The vertical axis on the left-hand side is the incumbent’s



















Figure 1 : The competitive market.
                                           
4 It is assumed that one entrant enters the domestic market. The results would not change if more than one
competitor would enter. The assumption of perfectly inelastic demand for electricity is acceptable in the short
run and helps the exposition. We will relax this assumption in section 4.STRANDED COSTS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 4
The competitive outcome
Under the assumptions listed above, the competitive market outcome will always be such
that  p MC MC I E = = , which is generally accepted as optimal from an efficiency point of
view. In Figure 1, the incumbent’s output would reduce to q*, whereas the entrant’s
output would be ( ) q q D - * . The implied price of electricity generation decreases
( p p
C R < ), but this is not a general result. In fact the market price is determined by the
marginal cost of the entrant.
Economic welfare
It can be shown that in this simple model social welfare increases as the market is
liberalised. Furthermore, it can also be shown that the change in social welfare is equal to
the efficiency gain that is made through improved production efficiency. The shaded area
in Figure 1 is a measure of this ‘benefit’.
3.3. The stranded costs
In order to show the stranded costs in a figure, we need to take a closer look at the fixed
costs. From section 2, it is clear that only those fixed or sunk costs imposed by the
regulator are candidates to become stranded, i.e. are strandable. In order to make this
distinction, the fixed costs are divided in strandable and non-strandable fixed costs ( FS
and FNS ). This results in the  AF C NS I -curve in Figure 2, which represents the average non-
strandable fixed costs. The next two subsections consider two cases.
3.3.1. The market price covers the average costs
In Figure 2, both the strandable and the non-strandable fixed costs are covered by the
market price. The domestic firm produces  * q  and makes an economic profit equal to the
area  p E E D
C
1 2 . As was said before, from an efficiency point of view this market outcome
is optimal. There is no reason why the government or any other regulator should intervene
by allowing the recovery of strandable costs since the market automatically arrives in a
























Figure 2 : The competitive price is higher than the average cost of the incumbent.
3.3.2. The market price does not cover the average costs but does
cover average variable costs
In this case, the market outcome could be as shown in Figure 3. Standard economic
theory then suggests that in the short run the firm will stay in the market since stopping
activity will only imply an even larger loss. The point E1 indicates the short run price-
output combination for the incumbent firm. This point implies a loss per unit of output
equal to E E 2 1 and a total loss equal to the rectangle  DE E p
C
2 1 . The stranded costs in this
case are equal to that part of the strandable costs that is not recovered via the market,


























Figure 3 : The competitive price is lower than the average cost of the incumbent.STRANDED COSTS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 6
Again, from the point of view of efficiency there is no case for allowing stranded cost
recovery
5. The incumbent incurs a loss due to the presence of strandable costs, but this
does not influence his output decision. The Pareto-efficient output will still be the
outcome.
One could also turn around the question: is there a case for not allowing stranded cost
recovery? No, there is neither. If the incumbent is allowed to recover stranded costs and if
the recovery is organised in a competitively neutral way, then the firm will choose the
same Pareto-efficient output. The difference between both cases is that the burden of
stranded costs is (partially) shifted from the firm to the customers and/or the government.
Standard economic theory also suggests that a firm, not able to cover its fixed costs in the
short run, will leave the market in the long run. This is true, but in the present model, the
situation might be slightly different because strandable costs are a short run phenomenon.
In the long run, the owners of the firm will absorb the strandable costs, and the firm will
only reoptimise its non-strandable fixed costs. If it is possible for the firm to cover its long
run average costs (now not containing any strandable costs anymore) with the market
price, then it will stay in the market. If on the other hand, the firm is not able to cover its
long run average costs through the market price, then it will leave the market. From an
efficiency point of view, this would even be optimal.
This reasoning puts an upper limit on the financial support for stranded cost recovery. The
support may not be larger than the amount of the strandable costs. If the regulator sets
the compensation at a level that covers more than the strandable costs, then he is
subsidising some of the non-strandable fixed costs of the incumbent, which may create
the wrong incentives for the incumbent. The incumbent may decide to stay in the market,
whereas we know that this is not optimal from the point of view of efficiency.
4. SOME SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents some numerical simulations. The basic features of the graphical
model remain present in the numerical model, but the latter also includes some realistic
extensions and is calibrated on the Belgian electricity sector in 1996. Even then, the model
is kept as simple as possible and focuses only on the most relevant aspects of the
stranded cost discussion.
4.1. A Brief Description of the Model
The demand for electricity is modelled in a very simple and global way. It is assumed that
the yearly demand for GWh depends on the price per GWh in a linear way. Two consumer
types are distinguished: small (residential) consumers (including SME) and large (industrial)
consumers. No other possible market segmentations are distinguished.
The liberalisation of the electricity market is assumed to have no effect on the demand in
the residential market (since competition is not allowed in that market), but it does have
an effect on the demand in the industrial market as it is faced by the domestic producer of
                                           
5 Note that in the stranded cost debate, many other economic and non-economic arguments are raised both in
favour of and against stranded cost recovery. See for example, Boyd (1998), Baumol and Sidak (1995) and
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electricity. Technically speaking, the residual demand on that market becomes more
elastic.
Before the liberalisation, electricity supply is provided by one domestic firm. After the
liberalisation, this monopoly situation remains present in the residential market, but
competition is introduced in the industrial market. Competition comes from foreign
producers, as described in section II. In the base case, the domestic firm has no market
power, i.e. residual demand if perfectly elastic.
It is assumed that the domestic firm behaves in a profit maximising way. The entrant’s
output equals the difference between the market demand at that price and the quantity
sold by the incumbent. The cost structure of the electricity-generating firm is as described
in section II. The model also takes into account transmission and distribution losses.
The model is calibrated for the Belgian electricity market in 1996. The data are taken from
the annual report of the CCEG (Controlecomité voor de Elektriciteit en het Gas (1998)).
4.2. The base case Simulations
Table 3 (see Appendix) presents the results of 3 simulation exercises. Simulation 1
describes the regulated electricity sector in 1996, simulation 2 simulates the liberalisation
of the electricity market for industrial consumers without stranded cost recovery and,
finally, simulation 3 simulates a scenario for stranded cost recovery via a fee on
transmission. The discussion in this section concentrates on the changes in the surpluses
of the consumers, producers, the government and overall welfare. The results are
presented in Table 2.
Simulation 1: Before the liberalisation
The average consumer price in the residential sector equals 4,920 BEF per kWh. In the
industrial sector the consumer price equals 1,706 BEF per kWh (see Table 3 in the
appendix). Both (maximum)prices are imposed by the regulator
6. At that price, the
residential and the industrial sector consume 43.807,0 GWh and 25.180,0 GWh,
respectively. The incumbent’s net profit from generation and transmission activities equals
24.290,4 Mln BEF. The net profit from participation in intercommunalities equals 5.447,2
Mln BEF.
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Base Case ( Base Case (ef =  ef = -¥  and   and mcf =1,500) mcf =1,500)






Producer surplus -176 4.403
Government surplus -67 -55
Total change 13 13 -502 -502
ef =  ef = -¥  and   and mcf =1,200 mcf =1,200
Change in Change in 2 2 3 3
Consumer surplus 9.712 4.100
Res 0 0
Ind 9.712 4.100
Producer surplus -3.371 1.468
Government surplus -1.285 -1.073
Total change 5.056 5.056 4.494 4.494
ef =-2,100 and  ef =-2,100 and mcf =1,500 mcf =1,500
Change in Change in 2 2 3 3
Consumer surplus -4.131 -8.412
Res 0 0
Ind -4.131 -8.412
Producer surplus 2.712 6.601
Government surplus 1.034 783
Total change -386 -386 -1.029 -1.029
Table 2 : Changes relative to the regulated market outcome (in Mln BEF).
Simulation 2: The opening of the market for the industrial sector (no strandable cost
recovery)
Table 2 shows that under the base case assumptions the market liberalisation results in a
small welfare gain for the industrial consumers (256 Mln BEF). This result depends on two
critical parameters: the price of foreign electricity (1,500 BEF per kWh) and the price
elasticity of the residual demand for electricity (-¥). Both parameters will be the subject
of a sensitivity analysis.
The domestic producer’s profit decreases with 176 Mln BEF but remains positive. Thus,
under the assumptions used in this simulation, there are no stranded costs. There is also a
small decrease in the government surplus of about 67 Mln BEF because of the decreased
corporate profit tax receipts. Overall, social welfare increase with about 13 Mln BEF per
year. In general, the effects are rather small. This is has to do with the base case
assumptions as will become clear in the sensitivity analysis.STRANDED COSTS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 9
Simulation 3 : Strandable cost recovery through an access fee for all producers
Assume that one decides ex ante that a strandable cost recovery is allowed for a total
amount of 15 billion BEF per year. From simulation 2 it is clear that this is not really
needed as profits remain positive. A fee for access to the transmission grid is used as the
instrument for recovery
7.
Social welfare decreases by 502 Mln BEF. The main losers are the industrial consumers.
Two effects explain this result. First, the producers shift to the transmission fee to the
customers, which increases the consumer price for electricity. Second, as a consequence
of the increased consumer price, less electricity is consumed. Because of the price ceiling,
the incumbent cannot use his market power in the residential market. As a result, in the
residential market the full burden of the transmission fee is carried by the producer (the
producer price decreases). The producer’s overall profit increases, but with less than 15
Bln BEF.
4.3. Sensitivity Analysis
The full simulation results are available in the Appendix. We primarily concentrate on
simulation 2, because it appears that the major impact of the parameter changes
considered in this section is on the effect of the liberalisation.
Sensitivity analysis suggests that the elasticity parameter has a relatively small impact on
the overall welfare (Table 4). However, it does have a significant effect on the distribution
of the benefits and losses from the market liberalisation. The more elastic the residual
demand the more the benefits go to the industrial consumers. The less elastic, the more
the benefits are taken by the producer, because inelastic demand allows the producer to
take advantage of his market power. Once the liberalisation has taken place, the effects of
strandable cost recovery on the distribution of the welfare gains are comparable to the
effects in the base case simulations.
Table 5 contains the results of a sensitivity analysis on the entrant’s marginal cost of
electricity generation. Compared to Table 3, the results in this table are based on a
marginal cost of electricity generation for the entrant equal to 1,200 BEF per kWh.
Intuitively, a lower price of foreign electricity leads to increased social benefits from
liberalisation. At the same time, the domestic producer will lose some of his profits. The
industrial consumers reap the benefits. With this assumption, there is a large shift in the
market share in the industrial market.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the stranded costs problem for the electricity sector. Stranded costs
have to do with the transition from a regulated to a more competitive market. A distinction
is made between strandable costs and stranded costs. Strandable costs are fixed or sunk
costs imposed by the regulator. Strandable costs become stranded when they cannot be
recovered via the market when the market is opened up for competition. When one is
                                           
7 Many other instruments are available to organise the stranded cost recovery. See Baxter et al. (1997) for a
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concerned about economic efficiency, allowing for stranded costs recovery is not
necessary. On the other hand, allowing for recovery would not hurt either, but if financial
support for stranded cost recovery is given, then it should be organised in a competitively
neutral way. Moreover, there is an upper limit to the size of the support, i.e. it may not be
larger than the strandable costs. Of course, if there is no recovery of stranded costs, then
the firm will make a loss on the home market but this does not result in inefficiencies.
A simple economic model was used to test what could be the welfare effects of a
transmission fee to recover stranded costs. The effect on welfare of opening the electricity
market for the big industrial consumers depends on the supply price of the foreign
producers and on the ease with which the big consumers switch to another supplier.
When the supply price of the foreign producer is only slightly lower than the marginal cost
of the home producer, opening the market could give welfare gains and higher profits for
the home firm. The welfare gains come from imports at lower costs than the indigenous
production. Despite the loss of market share for the home producer, his gross profits are
not affected much because of two reasons. First the protected market is responsible for
the major share of the gross profits. Secondly, the home producer might be able to charge
higher prices at home for the market share he keeps at home. In the sensitivity studies,
the opening of the market does not lead to negative profits and therefore the strandable
cost would never become stranded.
Although the probability of stranded costs is rather low, one could imagine several types
of ex ante allowances to recover strandable costs. A transmission fee would generate a
welfare loss compared to the non-recovery case. This means that increasing the profits of
the home firm by making the small or large consumers pay more will generate a net loss
for the society as a whole.REFERENCES 11
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Full simulation results
Variable Variable Sector Sector Unit Unit 1 1 2 2 3 3
Consumer price res BEF/kWh 4,920 4,920 4,920
Consumer price ind BEF/kWh 1,706 1,696 1,906
Producer price res BEF/kWh 4,066 4,066 3,892
Producer price ind BEF/kWh 1,706 1,696 1,696
Marginal cost of electricity generation BEF/kWh 1,550 1,556 1,529
Marginal cost of electricity (generation ﬁ transmission) ind BEF/kWh 1,690 1,696 1,879
Transmission fee BEF/kWh 0,000 0,000 0,210
Distribution fee BEF/kWh 0,000 0,000 0,000
Demand with domestic producer res GWh 43.807,0 43.807,0 43.807,0
Demand with domestic producer ind GWh 25.180,0 25.557,2 23.686,5
Demand with entrant GWh 0,0 302,5 0,0
Firm profit from distribution Mln BEF 5.447,2 5.447,2 5.447,2
Net profit of generation and transmission  activities Mln BEF 24.290,4 24.094,9 29.182,9
Profit of the communalities from distribution Mln BEF 17.552,6 17.552,6 17.552,6
Table 3 : Full simulation results (marginal cost of the foreign entrant = 1,500
and elasticity of residual demand = - infinity).Variable Variable Sector Sector Unit Unit 1 1 2 2 3 3
Consumer price res BEF/kWh 4,920 4,920 4,920
Consumer price ind BEF/kWh 1,706 2,027 2,196
Producer price res BEF/kWh 4,066 4,066 3,892
Producer price ind BEF/kWh 1,706 2,027 1,986
Marginal cost of electricity (generation ﬁ distribution) res BEF/kWh 1,550 1,403 1,390
Marginal cost of electricity (generation ﬁ transmission) ind BEF/kWh 1,690 1,543 1,740
Transmission fee BEF/kWh 0,000 0,000 0,210
Distribution fee BEF/kWh 0,000 0,000 0,000
Demand with domestic producer res GWh 43.807,0 43.807,0 43.807,0
Demand with domestic producer ind GWh 25.180,0 15.013,2 14.124,7
Demand with entrant GWh 0,0 10.846,5 9.561,8
Firm profit from distribution Mln BEF 5.447,2 5.447,2 5.447,2
Net profit of generation and transmission  activities Mln BEF 24.290,4 27.303,5 31.624,7
Profit of the communalities from distribution Mln BEF 17.552,6 17.552,6 17.552,6
Table 4 : Full simulation results (marginal cost of the foreign entrant = 1,500
and elasticity of residual demand = - 2,100).Variable Variable Sector Sector Unit Unit 1 1 2 2 3 3
Consumer price res BEF/kWh 4,920 4,920 4,920
Consumer price ind BEF/kWh 1,706 1,385 1,586
Producer price res BEF/kWh 4,066 4,066 3,900
Producer price ind BEF/kWh 1,706 1,385 1,385
Marginal cost of electricity generation BEF/kWh 1,550 1,245 1,245
Marginal cost of electricity (generation ﬁ transmission) ind BEF/kWh 1,690 1,385 1,586
Transmission fee BEF/kWh 0,000 0,000 0,201
Distribution fee BEF/kWh 0,000 0,000 0,000
Demand with domestic producer res GWh 43.807,0 43.807,0 43.807,0
Demand with domestic producer ind GWh 25.180,0 4.176,3 4.166,9
Demand with entrant GWh 0,0 24.783,3 22.715,7
Firm profit from distribution Mln BEF 5.447,2 5.447,2 5.447,2
Net profit of generation and transmission  activities Mln BEF 24.290,4 20.545,1 25.921,0
Profit of the communalities from distribution Mln BEF 17.552,6 17.552,6 17.552,6
Table 5 : Full simulation results (marginal cost of the foreign entrant = 1,200
and elasticity of residual demand = - infinity).1
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